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Fund flows, manager change and performance persistence 
 
Wolfgang Bessler, David Blake, Peter Lückoff, and Ian Tonks 
 
Abstract 
 
Most empirical studies suggest that mutual funds do not persistently outperform an appropriate 
benchmark in the long run. We analyze this lack of persistence in terms of two equilibrating 
mechanisms: fund flows and manager changes. Using data on actively managed U.S. equity 
mutual funds, we find that if neither mechanism is operating, winner funds (top-decile ranked in 
previous year) continue to significantly outperform loser funds (bottom-decile ranked in previous 
year) by 4.08 percentage points per annum. However, the difference between previous winner 
and loser funds declines to zero within one year if the two mechanisms are acting together. Thus, 
mutual fund out- and underperformance is unlikely to persist in well-functioning markets. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely recognized that equity mutual fund performance does not persist in the long term, 
even though some studies indicate some short-term persistence.1 Understanding the reasons for 
this may allow us to differentiate between fund manager luck and fund manager skill. A lack of 
performance persistence may be evidence of luck in previous periods or may be due to the 
operation of “equilibrating mechanisms” (Berk and Green, 2004; p. 1,271) which ensure that 
future expected excess returns of mutual funds are zero, even in the presence of differential fund 
manager abilities. The two main mechanisms are fund flows and manager turnover.  
The fund flow mechanism was proposed by Berk and Green (2004) who argued that 
even with skilled managers, monies flowing into previously successful funds, and out from 
underperforming funds, ensures mutual fund market equilibrium with zero expected abnormal 
returns. Due to decreasing returns to scale in active fund management, the growth in fund size of 
recent winner funds cause their performance to deteriorate, while loser-fund performance 
benefits from withdrawals that force managers to re-optimize their portfolios.  
With respect to the manager turnover mechanism, Khorana (1996) reports an inverse 
relationship between manager changes and fund performance. Star fund managers are able to 
extract a larger share of the higher fee income by either moving to a larger fund within the same 
organization or to another fund family (Hu et al., 2000), or being hired away to a hedge fund 
(Kostovetsky, 2010).2 Underperforming funds may replace their managers through some 
disciplining device: such managers may be demoted to run smaller funds in the same fund 
                                                 
 
1 See, e.g., Hendricks et al. (1993), Carhart (1997) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) for long-term performance 
persistence, and Bollen and Busse (2005), Busse and Irvine (2006) and Huij and Verbeek (2007) for short-term 
performance persistence. Busse et al. (2010) document a similar pattern for institutional funds. 
2 Deuskar et al. (2011) find that many mutual funds are able to retain out-performing managers even when faced 
with competition from the hedge fund industry, although any increase in salaries may be reflected in higher 
management fees and lower net returns to investors 
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family or fired after a sustained period of poor performance. Dangl et al. (2008) develop a 
model of the mutual fund industry which combines fund flows and manager changes for 
underperforming funds. Both winner and loser funds faced with a manager departure need to 
hire a replacement manager from the pool of available fund managers with unconditionally 
average skills. Such average skills will be lower than the recently departed star manager, but 
higher than the fired loser-fund manager. 
We investigate how far these two mechanisms explain mean reversion in mutual fund 
performance and whether they interact as substitutes or complements. If they are complements, 
then they should be more effective in eliminating performance persistence when operating 
together. If they are substitutes, then the incremental effect of one mechanism, conditional on 
the other operating, should be close to zero. In fact, we find that the two mechanisms act as 
complements for both past outperforming (winner) and past underperforming (loser) funds, 
based on a sample of 6,207 actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds over the period from 
1992 to 2011, with fund flows acting as the dominant mechanism, and manager changes 
reinforcing the fund-flow effect.  
For winner funds, we find those experiencing both of the equilibrating mechanisms – 
having relatively high net inflows and a manager change – underperform those in which neither 
mechanism operates by 0.19 percentage points per month (2.28 percentage points per annum)3 
on a risk-adjusted basis in the following year. Of this, 0.15 percentage points per month is 
accounted for by fund flows alone and just 0.01 percentage points per month by manager change 
                                                 
 
3 We report fund performance in percent/ percentage points per month throughout the paper as our analysis is based 
on monthly fund returns. However, for comparison with other studies, we add percent/ percentage points per annum 
in parentheses in some sections. 
4 
 
alone, confirming that, for winner funds, the two mechanisms are complementary, but with fund 
flows having a much bigger impact.  
For loser funds, as predicted by Dangl et al. (2008), we also detect a strong interaction 
effect between both mechanisms. Manager changes, interpreted as an “internal governance” 
device, and outflows, treated as an “external governance” device, reinforce each other and the 
combined effect is a 0.16 percentage points per month (1.92 percentage points per annum) 
higher risk-adjusted performance for loser funds experiencing both forms of governance relative 
to funds experiencing neither. Of this, 0.10 percentage points per month is due to fund flows and 
0.03 percentage points per month due to manager change, also confirming – but this time for 
loser funds – that the two mechanisms are complementary, again with fund flows dominating.  
We go on to examine the spread in subsequent 12-month performance between winner 
and loser funds, and we identify an unconditional spread of 0.22 percentage points per month 
(2.64 percentage points per annum) in alphas, similar to the results in Carhart (1997). By 
conditioning only on winner and loser funds that do not experience either of the equilibrating 
mechanisms, our results produce a highly significant winner-minus-loser spread of 0.34 
percentage points per month (4.08 percentage points per annum) in the subsequent year. In 
contrast, by conditioning on winner and loser funds experiencing both mechanisms, the 
corresponding spread narrows to an insignificant -0.02 percentage points per month (-0.24 
percentage points per annum), implying that the substantial difference in alphas of 1.71 
percentage points per month (20.52 percentage points per annum) between winner and loser 
funds in the portfolio formation period is completely eliminated in the evaluation period. These 
results indicate that a combination of both fund flows and manager changes explain the lack of 
performance persistence in mutual fund performance, and that performance persists when funds 
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are not exposed to at least one mechanism. Further, we find evidence of time-varying 
predictability in fund performance, with the poor performance of loser funds being more likely 
to persist in bear markets. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a review of the 
literature and is followed by a section developing our hypotheses. In section 4, we describe our 
data set and explain our research methodology. Our results are discussed in section 5: using 
ranked portfolio tests, we analyze fund flows, manager changes and their interaction for winner 
and loser funds separately, and then examine the spread in winner-minus-loser fund 
performance. We undertake some robustness tests in section 6. Section 7 concludes and 
discusses the implications of our findings. 
2. Literature Review 
Empirical support for the Berk and Green (2004) fund flows explanation is provided by Chen et 
al. (2004) and Yan (2008) who find that transaction costs are positively correlated with both 
fund size and the degree of illiquidity of the investment strategy, and that small funds 
outperform large funds. However, this is only an indirect test of the Berk-Green hypothesis. 
Although the finding that small funds outperform large funds is consistent with decreasing 
returns to scale, differences in fund size are the result of both external growth, due to the net 
inflows accumulated throughout a fund’s full history since inception, and internal growth, due to 
differential performance. Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Lynch and Musto (2003) document that 
past outperformance triggers large inflows, but that investors in poorly performing funds 
typically fail to withdraw their investments. Explanations for such behavior include: the 
anticipation of a strategy change by the incumbent manager, the firing of a poorly performing 
manager, a disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Singal and Xu, 2011), and investor 
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inertia (Berk and Tonks, 2007). Edelen (1999), Alexander et al. (2007) and Dubofsky (2010) 
argue that excessive inflows or outflows encourage liquidity-motivated rather than valuation-
motivated trading by the managers subject to these flows and induce immediate transaction 
costs, both of which are detrimental to short-run fund performance. Wermers (2000) reports that 
inflows and outflows lead to excessive cash holdings which contribute to fund 
underperformance by 0.7 percent per year. Rakowski (2010) documents that funds with more 
volatile flows underperform those with less volatile flows, which implies that outflows can be as 
harmful for future performance as inflows, a finding that is incompatible with Berk and Green’s 
(2004) conjecture that underperforming funds benefit from withdrawals. Even worse, large 
outflows can result in liquidity-motivated fire sales which distort fund performance and impose 
even higher costs on loser funds (Coval and Stafford, 2007). Thus, there may be asymmetric 
effects of fund flows on loser funds and winner funds.  
A number of papers document an inverse relationship between fund performance and 
manager changes (Khorana, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Gallagher and Nadarajah, 2004; 
Kostovetsky and Warner, 2015). Khorana (2001) reports that a manager change results in a 
deterioration in the performance of outperforming funds, and an improvement in the 
performance of recently underperforming funds. The Dangl et al. (2008) model of 
underperforming funds predicts – for most sets of parameter values – that there will be capital 
outflows pre-replacement if there is underperformance by the incumbent manager, which 
subsequently reverts after the manager is replaced. Kostovetsky and Warner (2015) argue that 
fund flows and manager changes are often connected, with fund flows increasing after a 
manager change. 
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3. Hypotheses Development 
Our aim is to explain empirically the lack of persistence in mutual fund returns, and test the 
prediction that fund flows, fund manager changes or a combination of these two mechanisms 
can explain the documented mean reversion in mutual fund performance. We use performance-
ranked portfolio strategies to first identify the lack of persistence in the outperforming and 
underperforming groups of funds, and then test whether sub-groups of winner and loser 
portfolios formed on the basis of fund flows and manager changes also display no persistence.  
These mechanisms may operate in different ways for winner and loser funds, and 
therefore we analyze each group separately in Section 5. Our approach is to condition the 
sample of mutual funds by the type of mechanism – using single and double sorts – and examine 
whether performance persistence is absent in those sub-groups that feature high net inflows and 
manager changes.4 If there is no persistence (i.e., there is mean reversion), then we will 
hypothesize that this is due to flows and/or manager changes;5 with the corollary that if there is 
persistence (i.e., no mean reversion), the mechanisms are absent.  
There are several reasons to believe that fund flows and manager changes are not 
independent of each other. Both mechanisms will be triggered by past performance, and the 
findings of Khorana (2001), that manager changes affect future fund performance, might, in part 
be attributable to the effect of contemporaneous fund flows – either directly or by fund flows 
prompting a manager change. Thus, it is important to control for this interaction. Moreover, 
                                                 
 
4 A concern with our approach, identified by a referee, is that the samples of funds on which these comparisons are 
conducted are not nested, so there is no counterfactual for the same group of funds with and without the two 
equilibrium forces. In order to address this concern, we report below the result of a robustness test in which we 
match the sample of funds in terms of a number of unconditional characteristics potentially correlated with fund 
flows and the firing/hiring decision and test whether the samples diverge from each other. 
5 In this case, we will observe a significant difference in the spread of raw returns (or Jensen-alphas) between sub-
samples of funds with one or both mechanisms operating and sub-samples with neither mechanism working. 
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fund flows may have a differential effect on fund performance for new managers as compared 
with incumbent managers.  
In order to assess these interaction effects in detail, we classify the fund-flow and 
manager-change mechanisms as being substitutes if the performance impact of one mechanism 
is smaller when the other mechanism operates simultaneously. Fund flows and manager changes 
are interpreted as being complements if the performance impact of one mechanism is larger 
when it operates jointly with the other mechanism. In those cases where the performance impact 
of each mechanism is the same, irrespective of whether it operates separately from or in 
combination with the other mechanism, the mechanisms will be classified as being independent 
of each other. 
We propose the following hypotheses on the joint effects of fund flows and manager 
changes on the performance persistence of winner and loser funds:  
y For winner funds experiencing high inflows, we expect a deterioration in subsequent 
performance, while for loser funds experiencing high outflows (i.e., low net inflows), 
we expect an improvement in subsequent performance. 
y For winner funds with a manager change, we expect a deterioration in subsequent 
performance, while for loser funds with a manager change, we expect an 
improvement in subsequent performance. 
y For funds experiencing both mechanisms, we expect either amplified (in the case of 
complements) or attenuated (in the case of substitutes) effects on future performance.  
In the case of winner funds, fund flows and manager changes are potential substitutes, 
because if net inflows remain low despite superior past performance, the fund manager is in a 
weaker position to negotiate a higher compensation package, increasing the likelihood of her 
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leaving. In contrast, if the fund is subject to high net inflows, the manager may decide to stay 
and benefit from a larger asset base and hence higher fees and salaries. A further reason for 
these mechanisms being substitutes is that a newly appointed fund manager is likely to adjust 
the portfolio holdings towards her own preferred investment strategy. If large net inflows occur 
at the same time, the manager could use these inflows efficiently to adjust the portfolio weights 
and, by doing so, reduce the marginal negative performance impact of high net inflows.  
Pollet and Wilson (2008), however, find that fund managers tend to scale up existing 
holdings as a response to inflows, in which case, fund flows and manager changes are 
complements among winner funds. Specifically, if managerial skill determines the number of 
“best ideas” a manager is able to generate (Cohen et al., 2010) and the newly hired manager has 
lower skills and hence fewer good ideas than the former manager, then the same level of inflows 
will have a stronger impact on lowering the performance of winner funds with a manager 
change than on those without.  
For loser funds, Dangl et al. (2008) predicts that internal and external governance 
mechanisms are potential substitutes. If the manager has been replaced, investors will no longer 
see any reason to withdraw money and instead will remain invested, waiting for a performance 
reversal. Similarly, if money has flowed out, the fund management company might decide that 
the existing manager will be able to improve a fund’s performance with the smaller asset base, 
consistent with the Berk-Green prediction. The manager-change mechanism operates when the 
fund management company fires an underperforming fund manager and performance improves 
under a newly appointed manager, leading to stronger mean reversion for loser funds with a 
manager change. 
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Alternatively, internal and external governance mechanisms in loser funds could 
reinforce each other and act as complements. If the market reacts quickly to poor past 
performance, the fund management company may fire a poorly performing manager in an 
attempt to stem outflows. Furthermore, causality could be reversed: if the disposition effect 
explains why many investors in poorly performing funds do not withdraw their investments, a 
manager replacement can serve as an attention trigger. Once investors are aware of both the 
manager change and the underperformance, they start withdrawing funds.6 Cremers and Nair 
(2005) investigate the interaction between internal and external control mechanisms in the 
context of corporate governance, and examine performance differentials between companies 
where one or both of these mechanisms are present. Their results have implications for the 
incentives and penalties facing corporate managers arising from the two governance 
mechanisms. Our study has similar implications for fund managers. Whether the equilibrating 
mechanisms are substitutes or complements is an empirical question that our data set allows us 
to investigate. 
Our final hypothesis follows naturally from the previous ones: 
y The spread in performance between previous winner and loser funds will be reduced 
if either or both equilibrating mechanisms are operating simultaneously. 
                                                 
 
6 There is a potential prisoners’ dilemma issue here whereby investors defer withdrawing money from poorly 
performing funds in anticipation of a manager change, but the fund management company delays firing the poorly 
performing fund manager because the outflows have not materialized. 
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The corollary is that in the absence of fund flow and manager changes, past winners will 
continue to outperform past losers, and there will be some persistence in both winner and loser 
fund performance.7 
4. Data and Research Methodology 
4.1. DATA 
Our mutual fund sample from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) starts in 1992, 
the first year for which reliable information on manager changes becomes available, and ends in 
2011. We follow Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) and select only actively managed U.S. domestic 
equity funds (see Table XIV in the Appendix). We aggregate all share classes of the same fund 
and drop all observations prior to the initial public offer (IPO) date given by CRSP as well as 
funds without names to account for a potential incubation bias (Evans, 2010). Our final sample 
consists of 6,207 funds that existed at some time during the period from 1992 to 2011 for at 
least 12 consecutive months. These funds have an average fund size of 875 million USD 
(Table I). Fund size increased over the sample period, whereas average fees fell from 1.45 
percent to 1.36 percent of assets under management.8 
[Please insert Table I about here] 
Monthly fund flows are constructed from the change in total net assets adjusted for internal 
growth from investment returns:  
݂݈݋ݓ௜௧ ൌ ܶܰܣ௜௧ െ ܶܰܣ௜௧ିଵሺ1 ൅ ܴ௜௧ሻ   (1) 
                                                 
 
7 Persistence is, however, likely to decline over time due to the operation of what we call “natural mean reversion”, 
discussed in detail in section 6.4. 
8 Fees are calculated as the sum of the annual expense ratio and 1/7th of the sum of the front end and back end loads. 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) both assume a seven-year average holding period for 
mutual funds. See French (2008) for an analysis of changes in the fee structure over time. 
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where TNAit refers to the total net assets of fund i at the end of period t and Rit is the return of 
fund i between t-1 and t, assuming that all distributions are reinvested and are net of fund 
expenses. On average, each fund received 2.57 million USD net inflows per month. 
To obtain information on manager changes, we focus on the variable “mgr_date” in the 
CRSP database, instead of using the specific names of the managers.9 This variable provides the 
date of the last manager change as reported by the fund management company. By using the 
manager date variable, we avoid any problems associated with different spellings of manager 
names. Furthermore, as the number of team-managed funds increased during recent years, the 
manager date variable has the advantage that companies only report significant changes in 
manager/management team that are likely to have an impact on performance (Massa et al., 
2010). A total of 7,919 manager changes occurred during our sample period, which means that, 
on average, 15 percent of the fund managers are replaced each year. 
4.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
We use ranked portfolio tests (Carhart, 1997, Carpenter and Lynch, 1999, and Tonks, 2005) to 
investigate the hypotheses outlined in Section 3.  
Funds are first ranked into equal-weighted decile portfolios based on their previous 
performance over rolling twelve-month periods. Then, in a second sorting of the top-decile-10 
and the bottom-decile-1 portfolios, we form subgroups based on fund flows (low net inflows / 
high net inflows) or manager changes (with manager change / without manager change): see 
                                                 
 
9 This variable has also been used by Lynch and Musto (2003) and Cooper et al. (2005). In theory, it shows the date 
that the manager leaves. However, for around 80 percent of observations, this is reported as the first of January. For 
the years 1992 and 1993, the variable is evenly distributed over different months. We conclude from this that the 
variable can only be used as an indicator of the year in which a manager change occurred. One implication of this 
that our data set is not sufficiently detailed to investigate the impact of the timing differences between fund flows 
and manager changes on subsequent fund performance. In other words, we are unable to test whether fund flows 
pre-date and hence possibly “cause” a manager change or vice versa. We are only able to indicate that there were 
changes in fund flows as well as a manager change within the same year and then assess what effect these had on a 
fund’s subsequent performance.  
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Figure 1.10 Furthermore, as we are interested in the interaction effects between both 
mechanisms, we also form subgroups by double sorting on fund flows and manager changes 
simultaneously (low with / low without and high with / high without). We analyze the 
performance of these subgroups of top and bottom decile portfolios and the performance of 
spread portfolios.  
[Please insert Figure 1 about here] 
The decile portfolios are formed either (a) on the basis of each fund’s alpha in the 
previous year or (b) on the basis of previous-year raw returns. For the first method, funds are 
ranked by alphas from a Carhart (1997) four-factor model estimated over the previous 12 
months (the formation period), where the four common factors are the excess return above the 
risk-free rate on the market index ሺܯܭ ௧ܶሻ, the returns on a size factor ሺܵܯܤ௧ሻ, a book-to-
market factor (ܪܯܮ௧ሻ, and a momentum factor (ܯܱܯ௧). Fund excess returns above the risk-free 
rate accounting for different fund styles are given by: 
ݎ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵ௜ܯܭ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶ௜ܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ߚଷ௜ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߚସ௜ܯܱܯ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧  (2) 
To assess performance and fund flows in a timely manner, we focus on the previous 12-
month horizon. Using such a short horizon to estimate alphas from a factor model is problematic 
on account of the low degrees of freedom available for estimating (2). Nevertheless, we are able 
to efficiently estimate (2) over this short horizon by applying the “empirical Bayes” adjustment 
                                                 
 
10 In Berk and Green (2004), active management suffers from decreasing returns to scale, but it is an empirical 
question whether these capacity constraints are absolute or relative. Absolute capacity constraints arise once a 
certain threshold of absolute fund size is exceeded. Relative capacity constraints differ across investment strategies 
and arise after the fund receives a certain level of inflows relative to the initial fund size. We analyze both absolute 
and relative net inflows, but, in the presentation of our results, we concentrate on absolute flows because the results 
for relative fund flows are qualitatively very similar, though slightly weaker. 
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procedure discussed in Huij and Verbeek (2007, hereafter HV), assuming a multivariate normal 
prior. Let ߠ௜ ൌ ሺߙ௜, ߚଵ௜, ߚଶ௜, ߚଷ௜, ߚସ௜ሻԢ be a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. The 
cross-sectional distribution of the funds’ alphas and betas is assumed to be normal, ߠ௜~ܰሺߤ,Σሻ, 
where ߤ is a 5-dimensional vector of cross-sectional means of alphas and betas, and Σ  is a 5x5 
covariance matrix. Assuming the errors in (2) are distributed as ߝ௜௧~ܫܫܰሺ0, ߪ௜ଶሻ, the posterior 
distribution of ߠ௜ is also normal with expectation:  
ܧሺߠ௜ሻ ൌ ൬
ଵ
ఙ೔
మ ௜ܺԢ ௜ܺ ൅ ߑିଵ൰
ିଵ
൬ ଵ
ఙ೔
మ ௜ܺԢ ௜ܺߠ෠௜ ൅ ߑିଵߤ൰ (3) 
where ௜ܺ is the matrix of returns on the four factors plus the intercept, ߠ෠௜ is the OLS parameter 
estimate, and ߪ௜ଶ is the variance of the errors in (2). The corresponding covariance matrix is 
given by: 
ܸሺߠ௜ሻ ൌ ൬
ଵ
ఙ೔
మ ௜ܺԢ ௜ܺ ൅ Σିଵ൰
ିଵ
 (4) 
As the prior mean µ and the prior covariance matrix Σ in Equations (3) and (4), we take 
the cross-sectional averages of the time series OLS estimates of the coefficients of (2) and their 
corresponding empirical covariance matrix for all funds in the cross section of our sample in a 
given 12-month formation period.11 Thus, we have the same priors for all funds in a given 
month. According to Equation (3), the posterior estimate of ߠ௜ is the matrix-weighted average of 
the prior ߤ and the OLS estimate ߠ෠௜; the same holds for the posterior estimate of the covariance 
                                                 
 
11 Specifically, we estimate time-series OLS regressions for each of the N funds in the data set for months 1 to 12. 
We average the N ߠ෠௜ estimates to form µ and use the empirical covariance matrix of these N ߠ෠௜ estimates to form Σ. 
We plug µ and Σ into Equations (3) and (4) to obtain the mean and variance of the posterior distribution of ߠ௜ for 
month 13. We repeat this process using the observations in months 2 to 13 in order to obtain the posterior 
distribution in month 14. We continue until the end of our data set using these rolling windows. 
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matrix in Equation (4).12 Confidence in the prior is the reciprocal of the estimation efficiency of 
the OLS estimate for each fund. Thus, the empirical Bayes adjustment “shrinks” any extreme 
parameters towards the mean of the prior, where the degree of shrinkage depends on the cross-
sectional dispersion of the parameters, given by Σ. The empirical Bayes adjustment is greater, 
the lower the estimation efficiency of the funds' OLS parameters. The intuition is that it is less 
likely for a fund to generate high alphas if all other funds generate relatively low alphas during 
the same period. However, the posterior distribution of ߠ௜ also takes the multivariate nature of 
the coefficients’ inter-relationship into account: e.g., if small-cap funds tend to have positive 
alphas (i.e., there is a positive correlation between ߙ௜ and ߚଶ௜ in Equation (2)), a negative OLS 
estimate of a small-cap fund i’s alpha receives a positive empirical Bayes adjustment. 
This argument is similar to the methodology of Cohen et al. (2005) who, in addition, take 
the similarity in investment strategies into account. They attribute a higher skill level to fund 
managers who deliver their outperformance with a similar strategy to other skilled fund 
managers in comparison with managers who used a completely different strategy. The latter are 
classified as lucky rather than skilled. Consequently, alpha-sorting based on Bayesian four-
factor alphas accounts for a risk-adjustment of the performance measure used for the ranking, 
corrects for different investment styles and reduces the influence of high-risk strategies on the 
ranking. We also compare these results with portfolio formation based on raw returns, but we 
                                                 
 
12 HV experimented with various methods to obtain the posterior estimates, such as simple linear shrinkage, 
iterative Bayes, and Gibbs sampling, but found that these other methods for estimating the posterior did not 
improve on their empirical Bayes approach, and therefore we follow HV in adopting the same approach.  
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believe that, in contrast to the raw return-sorting, the Bayesian alpha-sorting provides a much 
more reliable way of separating skilled from unskilled but lucky fund managers.13  
5. Empirical Results 
Figure 2 demonstrates that the dynamics of mutual fund returns over time are consistent with the 
earlier conclusions of Carhart (1997) who reported a lack of performance persistence and a 
strong tendency for performance to mean revert. Specifically, the top ten percent of funds 
(winner funds)14 generate average raw returns in the formation year of 1.45 percent per month 
which decline to 0.59 percent per month in the subsequent evaluation year. The bottom ten 
percent of funds (loser funds), in contrast, experience a mean reversion in raw returns from -
0.36 to 0.34 percent per month. In other words, a raw return spread between winner and loser 
funds of 1.81 percent per month (21.72 percent per annum) in the formation year declines to 
0.25 percent per month (3.00 percent per annum) in the evaluation year. Having established that 
performance persistence is mean reverting amongst both winner and loser funds, we now 
investigate how fund flows and manager changes influence these results. 
[Please insert Figure 2 about here]  
5.1. WINNER FUNDS 
Winner funds, on average, have a formation-period fund size of 794.0 million USD and receive 
8.5 million USD of new net inflows per month (Table II). They grow to an average size of 
1,037.0 million USD in the evaluation period due to internal (investment performance) and 
                                                 
 
13The average fund flows in the deciles and subgroups are not qualitatively different when we form portfolio deciles 
based on raw returns instead of the Bayesian four-factor alphas. Since raw returns are more relevant to retail 
investors who are unlikely to calculate four-factor alphas, it is comforting to know that average fund flows in the 
deciles and subgroups are not sensitive to the sorting criteria. The subgroups should not be affected as we explicitly 
use fund flows as a second sorting mechanism. 
14 Determined by having the highest 10 percent of Bayesian four-factor alphas. 
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external (fund flows) growth. Conditioning on fund flows, we separate winner funds into a 
subgroup with “low absolute net inflows” during the formation period, averaging -5.6 million 
USD per month, and a subgroup with “high absolute net inflows”, averaging 22.6 million USD 
per month, a significant difference of 28.2 million USD. The fraction of managers leaving 
winner funds is the same for both subgroups at 17 percent,15 but winner funds with low absolute 
net inflows tend to be smaller (675.0 million USD) than winner funds with high absolute net 
inflows (976.4 million USD).16 Conditioning on manager changes yields a subgroup “without 
manager change” which has slightly higher inflows (last row of panel (a)) and a larger average 
fund size (last row of panel (d)) compared to the subgroup “with manager change”.  
[Please insert Table II about here] 
Winner-decile-10 funds, on average, generate alphas of 0.01 percent per month, equivalent to a 
mean reversion from the formation to the evaluation period of -0.81 percentage points per 
month (Table III, panels (a) and (c), and Figure 3). Winner funds experiencing neither high 
inflows nor a manager change outperform the benchmark model (2) by an insignificant 0.08 
percentage points per month. This corresponds to a significant mean reversion of -0.69 
percentage points per month. Winner funds suffering from both high inflows and a manager 
change generate negative, albeit insignificant, alphas of -0.11 percent per month, equivalent to a 
significant mean reversion of -0.96 percentage points per month. The evaluation-period spread 
in alphas of 0.19 percentage points per month between winner funds experiencing neither 
                                                 
 
15 This is higher than the industry average of 15 percent across the sample period (which includes funds in deciles 
2-9 as well as those in deciles 1 and 10). 
16 According to Chen et al. (2004), differences in fund size affect fund performance. However, using relative net 
inflows instead of absolute net inflows yields more uniformly distributed subgroups with respect to fund size, but 
with very similar conclusions with respect to investment performance. Thus, our results do not seem to be affected 
by differences in fund size. 
18 
 
mechanism and those experiencing both is significant in statistical and economic terms (0.19 = 
0.08 (low/ without) – (-0.11) (high/ with), Table III, panel (a)). The difference in raw returns 
between winner funds suffering from both equilibrating mechanisms and those affected by 
neither is also striking: raw returns of the former revert to equilibrium at a statistically 
significant -1.16 percentage points per month compared with -0.62 percentage points per month 
for the latter (Table IV, panel (c)). We conclude from this that fund flows and manager changes 
acting together strongly contribute to mean reversion in winner-fund performance. 
[Please insert Tables III and IV and Figure 3 about here] 
As we have already seen in Table II, panel (b), the occurrence of a manager change 
seems to be independent of fund flows, since, on average, 17 percent of managers change each 
year in both subgroups with high and low net inflows. The difference in monthly fund flows 
between winner funds without and those with a manager change is statistically significant but 
economically small at 3.6 million USD. This suggests that the incidence of one mechanism does 
not affect the likelihood of the other mechanism occurring.  
Even though the mechanisms appear to operate independently of each other, controlling 
for one could still alter the impact of the other on future performance, and this is what we find. 
Among winner funds, there is evidence that the two mechanisms interact as complements. If 
there is a manager change, high fund inflows have a significantly negative impact on 
performance of 0.22 percentage points per month, whereas if there is no manager change, the 
effect of high inflows is to reduce performance by only (albeit a still significant) 0.13 percentage 
points per month (Table III, panel (a)). Comparing the single sort results, fund flows have a 
powerful effect on performance with the spread in alphas between the low-inflow and high-
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inflow groups being a significant 0.15 percentage points per month. In contrast, a single sort on 
manager change has little effect on the performance of these winner funds with only a 0.01 
percentage points per month spread.  
We conclude that fund flows by themselves and, especially if reinforced by a manager 
change, significantly affect winner-fund performance and that fund flows and manager changes 
are complementary to each other. However, high net inflows are much more harmful for 
subsequent performance than a manager change, possibly as a result of the transaction costs 
triggered by a liquidity-induced increase in trading. A manager change by itself has little effect. 
5.2. LOSER FUNDS 
Loser funds, on average, are smaller than winner funds with total net assets of 700.4 million 
USD in the formation period (Table V, panel (d)). Fund size decreases only slightly to an 
average of 681.0 million USD in the evaluation period. This is explained by negative net 
inflows, as expected, although these are relatively small in magnitude at only -2.3 million USD 
per month, on average. The explanation is that many investors are reluctant to withdraw money 
from poorly performing funds. We sort the loser-decile-1 funds into two subgroups on the basis 
of net inflows, one experiencing the lowest net inflows (i.e., the largest outflows) averaging -
12.4 million USD and the other with high net inflows averaging 7.8 million USD. The 
difference in average fund flows between the low- and high-fund-flow subgroups of loser funds 
is only about two-thirds as large as the same difference for winner funds (20.2 versus 28.2 
million USD). Loser funds with high net inflows and a manager change are the smallest 
subgroup in the formation period with an average size of 374.1 million USD, while loser funds 
experiencing both governance mechanisms simultaneously are the largest at 688.6 million USD 
(Table V, panel (c)).  
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[Please insert Table V about here] 
Tables VI and VII report the interactions of the two governance mechanisms and fund 
performance. Loser-fund performance, on average, reverts from alphas of -0.89 percent per 
month in the formation period to (a still significantly negative) -0.21 percent per month in the 
evaluation period, a statistically significant performance improvement of 0.68 percentage points 
per month (Table VI, and Figure 4). However, distinct differences emerge in evaluation-period 
performance when conditioning on the mechanisms. Loser funds that benefit from both 
mechanisms have insignificant alphas of -0.09 percent per month in the evaluation period 
compared with significant alphas of -0.90 percent per month in the formation period which 
corresponds to a significant and striking mean reversion of 0.81 percentage points per month. 
Funds without either form of mechanism continue to significantly underperform by -0.25 
percentage points per month, regressing to the mean by just 0.63 percentage points per month. 
The spread in alphas between loser funds experiencing both mechanisms and those benefiting 
from neither is a highly significant 0.16 percentage points per month (0.16 = -0.09 (low/ with) – 
(-0.25) (high/without), Table VI, panel (a)). Differences in mean reversion based on raw returns 
are even more pronounced: the raw returns of loser funds with a manager change and low net 
inflows improve by a (weakly) significant 0.84 percentage points per month; while the raw 
returns of loser funds without a manager change and high net inflows improve by an 
insignificant 0.56 percentage points per month (Table VII, panel (c)). Thus, if operating 
simultaneously, the internal and external governance mechanisms strongly contribute to an 
improvement in loser-fund performance.  
[Please insert Tables VI and VII and Figure 4 about here] 
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How do the mechanisms contribute to this effect? A comparison of the two subgroups 
reveals that they interact positively: funds with low net inflows have a higher fraction of 
manager changes (22 percent) than funds with high net inflows (16 percent),17 and funds with a 
manager change have lower net inflows (-4.5 million USD per month) than funds without (-1.8 
million USD per month) (Table V, panels (a) and (b)). Moreover, internal and external 
governance among loser funds are also complements in terms of their performance impact. The 
alpha spread between loser funds with low net inflows and those with high net inflows is 
significantly positive at 0.19 percentage points per month only when internal governance is 
operating at the same time. If there is no internal governance, this spread is a weakly significant 
0.08 percentage points per month (Table VI, panel (a)). Conversely, the spread between loser 
funds with a manager replacement and those without is positive but insignificant at 0.08 
percentage points per month if money is flowing out of the fund at the same time, while it is 
negative and also insignificant at -0.03 percentage points per month if outflows do not occur. 
Thus, internal governance seems to be more effective if external governance is simultaneously 
operating.  
The results for raw returns are similar in magnitude. Outflows improve loser-fund raw 
returns by a significant 0.21 percentage points per month in combination with a manager 
replacement, and a positive but insignificant 0.08 percentage points per month in the case of no 
manager change (Table VII, panel (a)). Compared with the similar sized alpha spread of the 
same subgroup, this implies that fund managers who stay with the fund do not seem to use the 
outflows to re-optimize their portfolio by bringing in new investment ideas, but merely scale 
                                                 
 
17 This compares with a 15 percent average turnover of managers across the industry and a 17 percent average 
turnover for winner fund managers, suggesting that high net inflows can protect even a poorly performing fund 
manager from being fired in some circumstances. 
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down existing investments in a way that reduces unfavorable factor loadings in the benchmark 
model. Specifically, loser funds without outflows have significantly negative momentum 
loadings, while those experiencing outflows reduce these loadings to levels close to zero (not 
reported in the tables).  
We conclude that loser funds suffer from two types of disposition effect: one due to 
investor behavior and one due to the actions of the fund management company. It appears that a 
large fraction of loser-fund investors are reluctant to withdraw their money. This behavior is 
consistent with a disposition effect, whereby investors are hesitant to realize losses and so stay 
invested in the hope that the fund price eventually returns to the original purchase price. 
However, our results also show that staying invested in loser funds is a sub-optimal strategy, 
because performance remains negative. The second disposition effect relates to the reluctance of 
the fund management company to fire the underperforming manager. Even when outflows 
occur, as in case of the low net inflow subgroups, the performance of existing fund managers 
does not respond positively to the smaller asset base. It is only when a manager change is 
combined with outflows that performance significantly improves. However, outflows by 
themselves have a significant effect in improving performance, although this is enhanced if the 
manager is also changed. 
5.3. WINNER-LOSER SPREAD 
The spread in alphas between winner and loser funds for the 12-month portfolio formation 
period is 1.71 percentage points per month, obtained as the difference between the unconditional 
alphas in panel (b) of Table III (0.82 percent per month) and Table VI (-0.89 percent per 
month). The spread in alphas between the winner and the loser funds for the 12-month 
evaluation period is 0.22 percentage points per month, obtained as the difference between the 
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unconditional alphas in panel (a) of Table III (0.01 percent per month) and Table VI (-0.21 
percent per month). This spread is similar to the winner-minus-loser spread in the Carhart 
(1997) study, although his spread is statistically significant.  
A key issue now is how this spread is affected by the equilibrating mechanisms. 
Specifically, we compare the performance of the winner and loser portfolios in seven different 
scenarios, which are defined in panel (a) of Table VIII. Panel (b) reports the corresponding 
alphas (see also Figure 5). In the first column of panel (b), we report the alphas of funds that 
experience neither mechanism. Our hypotheses suggest that we would expect to find the highest 
level of positive and negative performance persistence among these funds. The next two 
columns report the performance results when either the fund-flow or the manager-change 
mechanism is not operating. The fourth column reports the unconditional winner-minus-loser 
spread, not taking fund flows or manager changes into account. The next two columns report the 
results for funds that experience one of the mechanisms. In the last column, the results where 
both mechanisms operate simultaneously are reported. In this last case, we would expect to find 
the strongest tendency of fund performance to revert to the mean. 
[Please insert Table VIII and Figure 5 about here] 
We find that winner and loser funds that experience neither mechanism yield a highly 
significant winner-minus-loser spread of 0.34 percentage points per month (Table VIII, panel 
(b), column (1), and Figure 5). The spread does not change for funds not experiencing high 
inflows (column (2)). The spread falls to an insignificant 0.25 percentage points per month when 
conditioning on funds not experiencing a manager change (column (3)). For the unconditional 
winner-minus-loser spread portfolio, alphas turn out to be an insignificant 0.22 percentage 
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points per month as noted above (column (4)). This spread decreases further – when 
concentrating only on funds that experience either the manager-change mechanism or the fund-
flow mechanism – to an insignificant 0.20 and 0.09 percentage points per month, respectively 
(columns (5) and (6)). For winner and loser funds that experience both equilibrating 
mechanisms simultaneously, we find an insignificant spread between winner and loser funds of -
0.02 percentage points per month (column (7)). Thus, when investors and managers take 
advantage of outperformance or investors and the fund management company react to 
underperformance in the formation period, the equilibrating processes force the spread between 
previous winner and loser funds to become virtually zero (-0.02 percentage points per month) in 
the evaluation period. In contrast, if funds are not exposed to these mechanisms, the spread is a 
significant 0.34 percentage points per month. The equilibrating mechanisms seem to be able to 
explain the reduction in the winner-minus-loser spread by 0.36 percentage points per month.  
This highlights the importance of fund flows and manager changes in explaining mean 
reversion in mutual fund performance and why mutual fund performance is unlikely to persist in 
well-functioning markets. The table also reconfirms both the dominance of fund flows (cf. the 
difference between columns (5) and (6)) and the strong supporting role of manager changes 
when the fund-flow mechanism is also operating (cf. the difference between columns (6) and 
(7)). 
6. Robustness tests 
In this section, we document that these results are robust to a number of different tests.  
6.1. THE EFFECT OF DIFFERENT FACTOR MODELS 
We applied alternative five-factor models to investigate whether the results differed from those 
using the standard four-factor model in (2). In the first model, we included a mean reversion 
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factor (based on six value-weighted portfolios formed on the size and prior returns of all NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ stocks18) to the standard model: if winner funds hold on to winner stocks 
for another one or two years, these winner stocks might eventually experience mean reversion in 
returns (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987). In the second model, we included a liquidity-factor19 
to the standard model on the grounds that fund flows may also affect portfolio liquidity. We do 
not present the results using these models, but can confirm that they are qualitatively similar to 
those using (2). 
6.2. THE EFFECT OF INTRODUCING PEER-GROUP BENCHMARKS 
We adjusted for peer-group benchmarks, since these are widely used by practitioners for 
evaluation purposes. We used two alternative approaches.  
In the first approach, we define the peer-group-adjusted returns as the difference between 
the fund’s returns and the average returns of all peer-group funds with the same fund style. We 
classified the funds in our sample into 13 styles: large-cap, mid-cap, small-cap, growth, growth 
& income (G&I), income, sector funds (financial, health, natural resources, technology, utilities, 
other), and other. The results from evaluating performance from a ranking based on these peer-
adjusted benchmark returns are presented in Table IX for both winner and loser subgroups. 
Compared with the results for raw returns, the low-minus-high row is generally lower and the 
without-minus-with column is generally higher, but otherwise of similar order of magnitude (cf 
Table IX with panel (a) of Tables IV and VII). The only exception is for the returns of winner 
funds with a manager change but low net inflows which are significantly lower: the 
corresponding low-minus-high spread is no longer significant for this subgroup. The fact that 
                                                 
 
18 Downloaded from Kenneth French’s website: 
mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
19 Downloaded from Lubos Pastor’s website: faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research 
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the low-minus-high row is generally lower suggests that investors also respond to peer-group 
differences in the performance of fund managers (in addition to differences in alphas) and this 
contributes to the effectiveness of the fund-flow mechanism. 
[Please insert Table IX about here] 
The second approach that we adopted was to estimate the model recently suggested by 
Hunter et al. (2014) which adds an active peer benchmark (APB) to the four-factor model to 
control for the fact that estimation errors are potentially not independently distributed in the 
cross section of funds. Adding an APB can help to account for dynamically changing 
“commonalities” across fund returns (as a result of the funds following similar investment 
strategies) and to improve the estimation of the prior covariance matrix (see also Pastor and 
Stambaugh, 2002). Hunter et al. (2014) show that the APB can explain a significant proportion 
of the cross correlation between the residuals in the four-factor model for the different funds. In 
particular, they show that the within-group (individual fund pair) residual correlations are 
decreased by one-third to one-half of their prior levels, depending on the peer group. This 
indicates that the APB successfully captures common idiosyncratic risk-taking within peer 
groups. The APB for each peer-group was estimated as the residual series from a regression of 
an equal-weighted portfolio of all funds with the same investment style on the standard four 
factors in Equation (2). We used the same 13 investment styles as for the peer-group-adjusted 
returns listed above.  
Table X reports the performance evaluation results from ranking funds on the basis of 
this APB adjustment, and these results can be compared with the performance results from the 
standard benchmark model in Tables III and VI. The results are robust to the addition of the 
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APB for ranking on past performance. For winner funds, the alphas in panel (a) of Table X are 
in general similar to those in panel (a) of Table III. There is again one exception: winner funds 
with a manager change but low net inflows now significantly outperform the extended 
benchmark model (2) by 0.23 percentage points per month (without the APB adjustment, the 
outperformance was an insignificant 0.11 percentage points per month). The results for loser 
funds are quantitatively very similar, comparing panel (b) of Table X with panel (a) of Table VI.  
Overall, the addition of various peer-group benchmarks does not change the qualitative 
findings from the standard four-factor model. 
[Please insert Table X about here] 
6.3. A ROBUSTNESS TEST OF THE EMPIRICAL BAYES APPROACH 
In an unreported test, we addressed a concern that, in our empirical Bayes approach, the prior 
and conditioning information are potentially not independent because the prior is the cross-
sectional mean (ߠ௜ሻ of all the funds in the sample which includes the fund i under consideration. 
This could potentially bias our results if fund i is an outlier. We therefore re-estimated the model 
using the cross-sectional median rather than the mean as the prior to reduce the effect of any 
outliers. However, this did not significantly affect our results: monthly alphas only change by 1-
2 basis points and, in a very few cases, by 3 basis points. 
6.4. TESTING A COROLLARY TO OUR KEY HYPOTHESIS 
The key hypothesis in this paper is that if one or both of the equilibrating mechanisms are 
operating, then performance will not persist: there will be mean reversion which will be 
measured by the decline in alpha between the formation and evaluation periods. A corollary is 
that if performance does persist and neither mechanism is operating effectively, then other 
characteristics of the funds and the market in which those funds operate must explain the 
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persistence. To assess this, we formed sub-samples of funds that are matched on the basis of six 
key characteristics for which data are available: fund size, fund age, investment style, size of 
distribution fees, fund family size, and investor type. 
6.4.1 Winner Funds  
We begin with Table XI which looks at the effect of these characteristics on the performance 
persistence of winner funds. Consistent with the evidence in Table III, panel (g) of Table XI 
shows that, across the full sample, the decline in alpha between the formation and evaluation 
periods (Δα௧) averages -0.81 percentage points per month. However, the full sample includes 
around 600 sector-specific funds and funds with other investment styles whose behavior is 
unrepresentative of our overall results. When these funds are excluded, the decline in alpha 
between the formation and evaluation periods averages -0.76 percentage points (last row of 
panel (c)). Looking down the Δα௧ column, winner funds appear to revert to the mean between 
the formation and evaluation periods by, in general, between -0.70 and -0.93 percentage points. 
We argue that the lower end of this range, between -0.70 and -0.75 percentage points, measures 
what might be called the level of “natural mean reversion”. This is the mean reversion that takes 
place independently of the operation of the equilibrium mechanisms as a consequence of the 
luck of fund managers running out – most fund managers find themselves in the top decile of 
performance due to good luck.20 Natural mean reversion might not, however, completely 
eliminate performance persistence. If there is any additional mean reversion, we put this down 
to the operation of the equilibrating mechanisms. If, on the other hand, the mean reversion is 
less,21 then we can conclude that neither natural mean reversion nor the two mechanisms are 
                                                 
 
20 See Blake et al. (2014; 2017, forthcoming). 
21 The change in alpha is lower in absolute terms. 
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working effectively and, as a consequence, performance will persist – at least over the 12 month 
horizon. We examine the six characteristics in turn. 
(1) Fund size.22 Panel (a) shows that Δα௧ lies in the zone of natural mean reversion for 
both large and small funds. The last three columns indicate that the two mechanisms have no 
statistically significant effect, although the manager change mechanism has a little more power 
in economic terms in small funds than large funds, especially when combined with fund flows.  
(2) Fund age.23 Panel (b) shows that Δα௧ lies in the natural mean reversion zone for old 
funds, but it is larger in absolute terms for young funds. The last three columns reveal that the 
fund-flow mechanism is highly effective in young funds, especially when combined with a 
manager change. Funds flows also have some effect (albeit a statistically weaker one) in old 
funds. 
(3) Investment style. Most funds in the sample are either size or growth-versus-income 
oriented. The final row of panel (c) indicates that, when sector-specific funds and funds with 
other investment styles are excluded, Δα௧ lies just inside the range where the equilibrating 
mechanisms begin to become effective; the last three columns show that both mechanisms are 
indeed working well, especially in combination.  
Turning to the individual investment styles, we can see that both mechanisms are highly 
successful in removing the persistence in small-cap funds – which is a very intuitive finding, 
since such funds will have difficulties in managing flows for liquidity reasons. But the 
mechanisms do not work in growth funds, since Δα௧ = -0.70 is already in the natural mean 
reversion zone. The mechanisms are less effective in large- and mid-cap funds, despite having a 
                                                 
 
22 Large (small) funds are those with above (below) median size. Chen et al. (2004) and Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009) find a negative effect of fund size on performance. 
23 Old (young) funds are those with above (below) median age. Huij and Verbeek (2007) and Karoui and Meier 
(2009) report outperformance by young funds. 
30 
 
very large (in absolute terms) Δα௧ of -0.93. This is also an intuitive result, since it is difficult for 
fund managers trading in S&P500 stocks with deep and liquid markets to identify systematically 
mispriced securities. Winner fund managers focusing on these investment styles are more likely 
to be winners because of luck. The table shows that their luck disappears without any additional 
support from the two mechanisms. 
G&I and income funds are an outlier, with a Δα௧ of just -0.36 after 12 months, 
suggesting that mean reversion has not been completely achieved within this time frame. We 
examined this sub-sample in further detail and looked at 24- and 36-month formation and 
evaluation periods. We found that the equilibrating mechanisms – particularly, the fund-flow 
mechanism – take longer to work (between two and three years).24  
(4) Size of the distribution fee.25 This affects the strength of a fund’s distribution 
network. Panel (d) shows that the results are similar whether the distribution fee is high or low. 
In both cases, the size of Δα௧ suggests that at least one of the mechanisms will be effective, and 
the last three columns confirm that it is the fund-flow effect.  
(5) Fund family size.26 The size of Δα௧ in panel (e) suggests that at least one of the 
mechanisms is effective whether the fund family is large or small. The fund-flow mechanism is 
particularly effective in small fund families, especially in conjunction with a manager change. It 
is reasonable to conjecture that large fund families are more able to handle strong inflows and 
                                                 
 
24 Carhart (1997, Figure 2) showed that the top and bottom decile funds can take up to four years for the persistence 
to be eliminated in his 1962-1993 data set. 
25 High (low) distribution fees are those above (below) the median distribution fee. Distribution fees comprise the 
front-end load (as the majority of this is usually paid to a distribution partner) plus 12B-1 fees (annual marketing 
fees, generally between 0.25 and 1.00% (the maximum allowed) of a fund's net assets, named after a section of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940). Carhart (1997) documents a negative effect from fees on net performance. 
26 Large (small) fund families are those with above (below) median size. 
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situations where the manager is leaving than small fund families. So the equilibrating 
mechanisms should be weaker for larger fund families, which is what we find.  
(6) Investor type. Panel (f) shows that with institutional funds, the size of Δα௧ indicates 
that natural mean reversion will remove any persistence without the need for the equilibrating 
mechanisms. In the case of retail funds, fund flows, especially if reinforced by a manager 
change make a significant contribution to mean reversion. This confirms the well-known finding 
that retail investors react more strongly (and more irrationally) to good past performance than 
institutional investors (Del Gurcio and Tkac, 2002).  
 [Please insert Table XI about here] 
6.4.2 Loser Funds 
We now turn to Table XII which examines the effects of the same characteristics on the 
performance persistence of loser funds. If we again exclude the unrepresentative sector-specific 
and other investment-style funds, the increase in alpha between the formation and evaluation 
period averages 0.64 percentage points per month (last row of panel (c)). The Δα௧ column 
shows that loser funds appear to revert to the mean between the formation and evaluation 
periods by, in general, between 0.59 and 0.75 percentage points, which is lower both in absolute 
terms and in range than is the case with winner funds. We will again argue that the lower end of 
this range, say, between 0.59 and 0.63 percentage points, measures the level of natural mean 
reversion for loser funds – reflecting the fact that many loser fund managers find themselves in 
the bottom performance decile due to bad luck. It follows that any additional mean reversion is 
due to the operation of the equilibrating mechanisms, while a lower degree of mean reversion 
implies that the mechanisms are not working over the 12 month horizon. We again examine the 
six characteristics in turn. 
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(1) Fund size. Panel (a) shows that, for large funds, Δα௧ = 0.63 which is within the zone 
where natural mean reversion operates. This is confirmed by the last three columns which show 
that the two mechanisms are not working. However, for small funds, Δα௧ at 0.75 is much higher 
and this is explained by investors taking money out of these funds.  
(2) Fund age. Panel (b) reveals that both mechanisms are highly effective in removing 
persistence in old funds, but are completely ineffective in the case of young funds, despite the 
fact that Δα௧ is similar for both types of funds. It is also interesting to note that it is only in the 
case of old funds that the manager-change mechanism is effective by itself (see the single 
sorting with-minus-without column). This appears to suggest that investors are prepared to give 
the managers of new loser funds a chance to rectify their poor performance, but not those in 
established funds.  
(3) Investment style. The final row of panel (c) shows that the fund-flow mechanism is 
effective on average across all investment styles.27 Digging down more deeply, we observe that 
this mechanism is particularly effective with small-cap funds, and also with growth, large- and 
mid-cap funds if accompanied by a manager change. However, as with the case of winner funds, 
the mechanisms do not work in G&I and income funds over a one-year horizon (the Δα௧ is only 
0.44). Looking at 24- and 36-month formation and evaluation periods for these investment 
styles, we find that there is still some residual persistence even after three years, despite the fact 
that the manager-change mechanism has some effect over the 24 month horizon. A possible 
explanation for funds with G&I and income investment styles being outliers for both winner and 
loser portfolios is an investor clientele effect. These funds are primarily held by investors 
interested in their long-term income-generating capabilities and are eschewed by other types of 
                                                 
 
27 Panel (g) shows that this holds whether or not sector and other funds are included. 
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investor, e.g., those more interested in growth than income. Income-seeking investors will be 
prepared to hold on to loser funds, while growth-seeking investors will not rush into winner 
funds, preferring instead to look for more attractive opportunities in other sectors. 
 (4) Size of the distribution fee. Panel (d) shows that in terms of distribution fees, despite 
having virtually the same Δα௧, there is a powerful fund-flow effect in the case of funds with low 
distribution fees, but not in the case of funds with high distribution fees. The latter appear to be 
able to restrict outflows using a strong distribution network, thereby hindering the equilibrating 
mechanism.  
(5) Fund family size. In contrast with the case for winner funds, fund flows are more 
effective in restoring equilibrium in the loser funds of large fund families than those of small 
families, especially when combined with a manager change (panel (e)).28 Further, the internal 
governance mechanism is very weak, particularly in the case of small families: the latter might 
be owner-managed and the owner is unlikely to sack herself.  
(6) Investor type. Panel (f) shows that the results are similar to the case of winner funds. 
Natural mean reversion removes the persistence in institutional funds without the need for the 
equilibrating mechanisms. In the case of retail funds, fund outflows, especially if reinforced by a 
manager change, make a significant contribution to mean reversion, although it is weaker than 
in the case of winner funds. This is perhaps a little surprising, given the well documented 
evidence that retail customers are prone to a disposition effect. 
[Please insert Table XII about here] 
 
                                                 
 
28 This finding supports the predictions of Gervais et al. (2005) that a manager replacement in a large family 
contains more information, particularly if it is associated with an underperforming manager.  
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6.4.3 Comment 
The robustness tests in this section provide broad support for the key hypothesis of this paper: 
performance persists unless either the two equilibrating mechanisms or natural mean reversion 
operate to remove it. However, this needs to be qualified as follows. The mechanisms do not 
appear to work for loser G&I and income funds over a one-year horizon: in the case of winner 
funds with these investment styles, for example, it takes two years rather than one for the 
persistence to be eliminated.   
A further implication is that we do not find any other unobserved characteristic 
explaining the persistence spread. Our sorting procedure explains how we reach this conclusion. 
We re-form all portfolios every year based on the previous year’s performance. So, over the 
course of the full sample, individual funds move between the sub-portfolios (e.g., from winner 
to loser, from low to high flow, from without to with manager change, and vice versa). If the 
portfolios were established once at the beginning of the sample period, then it might be possible 
that another unidentified characteristic could explain the performance spread we observe. But 
with the continuous re-forming of portfolios, each fund will move across many different sub-
portfolios over the 20 years of our sample period. Hence, even if there is some unobserved 
characteristic, a fund with a specific embodiment of that characteristic would move between 
many different sub-portfolios over time and, thus, the characteristic is unlikely to play a 
significant role in explaining our findings.  
6.5. CONTROLLING FOR DIFFERENT MARKET CONDITIONS 
Glode et al. (2012) extend the Berk-Green framework to examine the issue of whether the way 
that investors respond to past performance through fund flows helps to identify predictability in 
mutual fund returns. They find that there is predictability in mutual fund returns and that it is 
also time-varying, with successful funds displaying persistent performance after periods of high 
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market returns, but not after periods of low market returns. They find no persistence in under-
performing funds, irrespective of market conditions. 
We adapt this analysis of time-varying persistence to examine the strength of the 
equilibrating mechanisms that we have identified, controlling for market conditions. Glode et al. 
(2012) identify up-markets and down-markets using excess market returns on a quarterly basis. 
Our data set does not allow us to conduct such a high-frequency analysis. Instead, we identify 
four sub-periods within the full sample from 1992 to 2011: 1992 to 2000 (bull market), 2001 to 
2003 (bear market), 2004 to 2007 (bull market) and 2008 to 2011 (bear market). Within each 
sub-period, we calculate both the degree of persistence in mutual fund performance and the 
alpha spreads on the basis of single and double sorts by fund flows and manager changes. 
The first column of panel (a) of Table XIII shows that there is little evidence of 
persistence (as measured by the evaluation period alpha) for the winner funds, irrespective of 
market conditions. The Δα௧ column indicates wide variation in the decline in alpha across the 
four sub-periods and there is insufficient information to determine the level of natural mean 
reversion, although it too is likely to differ widely across the sub-periods. Nevertheless, in most 
sub-periods, the persistence is removed by the operation of the fund-flow mechanism, if only 
weakly during the 2001-2003 bear market (column 4).  
There is, however, persistence for loser funds in both bear markets of 2001-2003 and 
2008-2011, despite, in the latter case, fund flows operating much more effectively than in the 
earlier bear market (panel (b)). This confirms findings first made by Carhart (1997) that there is 
some persistence in the worst performing loser funds. Carhart did not separate his 1962-1993 
data set into bull and bear sub-periods, but our findings would appear to suggest that any 
persistence in the worst performing loser funds will be concentrated in bear market sub-periods. 
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The only occasion in which manager changes had a statistically significant effect in eliminating 
persistence was in loser funds in the 1992-2000 bull market (column 6). 
[Please insert Table XIII about here] 
7. Conclusions and Implications 
We have examined the effects of fund flows and manager changes as equilibrating mechanisms 
in explaining the removal of  persistence in mutual fund performance over time. Using a CRSP 
sample of 6,207 actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds over the period from 1992 to 2011, 
we find that a significant part of the mean reversion in both winner and loser funds is explained 
by the two mechanisms operating together, i.e., by the responses of investors, fund managers 
and fund management companies to past performance.  
We have found that winner funds with high inflows experience a deterioration in 
subsequent performance. This effect is much more important in explaining below-average 
performance than, say, the impact of fees. We therefore provide empirical support for the Berk 
and Green (2004) hypothesis that inflows of new money contribute significantly to mean 
reversion. We also found that winner funds with a manager change suffer from a deterioration in 
subsequent performance, but the effect is very small compared with the impact of fund flows. 
Further, winner funds where both mechanisms operating simultaneously experience an 
amplified effect on future performance, confirming that the mechanisms are complements.  
With respect to loser funds, we found funds with high outflows enjoyed an improvement 
in subsequent performance. For loser funds with a manager change, we observe improved 
subsequent performance, but again the effect is very small compared with the impact of fund 
flows. Further, we found that loser funds experiencing both mechanisms benefit from an 
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amplified positive effect on future performance, again confirming that the two mechanisms are 
complements.  
The positive performance spread between previous winner and loser funds is completely 
eliminated if both equilibrating mechanisms are operating simultaneously and almost entirely 
eliminated if just the fund-flow mechanism is working in the two sets of funds. We also confirm 
the corollary that, in the absence of the two mechanisms, there is persistence in fund 
performance with past winners continuing to outperform past losers. We can additionally 
confirm that any persistence in the worst performing loser funds will be concentrated in bear 
market sub-periods. 
What are the potential implications of these findings? Investors should pay close 
attention to fund flows and the resulting changes in fund size as well as to the career paths of 
individual fund managers across different funds: our results suggest that superior past 
performance is only a reliable indicator of future performance for those cases where the 
manager remains in post and fund flows are not excessively responsive to past performance. An 
example of a potentially successful strategy would therefore be to invest in previous-year 
winner funds with low inflows and no manager change.29 Of course, investors pursuing such a 
strategy will only speed up the equilibrium process and only first movers might have any 
prospect of benefiting. Following directly from this, it would be very valuable for investors and 
for the market equilibrium processes to work more efficiently if fund management companies 
were required to publish regular information on fund flows and report any manager changes 
immediately.  
                                                 
 
29 Investors could potentially earn 0.08 percent per month abnormal returns (Table III, panel (a)). 
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Our robustness results indicate that the mechanisms are more effective in the following 
types of winner funds: small funds, young funds, small-cap funds, funds from small fund 
families, and retail funds. They are also more effective in the following types of loser funds: 
small funds, old funds, funds in most investor style categories, and retail funds. However, 
investors should be aware that growth & income and income funds are unusual in that mean 
reversion takes longer to establish in winner funds than is the case with funds with a different 
investment style (around two years instead of one); while in the case of loser funds, there 
remains some persistence even after three years. We put this finding down to an investor 
clientele effect: investors appear to be primarily interested in income generation and this 
dominates concerns about short-term capital value losses. Finally, if they are living through a 
bear market, investors can expect the poor performance of the worst performing loser funds to 
last for longer than in boom conditions.  
Overall, our results are consistent with studies which show that, while true investment 
skill exists, investors usually cannot benefit from it (e.g., Berk and van Binsbergen, 2016; Blake 
et al., 2014; 2017, forthcoming). 
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Appendix: Data Selection 
In constructing our sample, we follow Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) and select only domestic 
equity funds. We exclude international funds, global funds, balanced funds, flexible funds, and 
funds of funds. We further drop all funds containing terms in their name that commonly refer to 
passive vehicles. We require our funds to have at least 12 months of return data available to be 
included in our sample. Additionally, we drop all observations prior to the IPO date given by 
CRSP and funds without names in order to account for a potential incubation bias (Evans, 
2010). This results in 6,207 funds that existed at some time during our sample period from 1992 
to 2011. Different share classes of the same fund have the same manager and fund flows of 
individual share classes cancel out at the portfolio level. Hence, we combine all share classes 
that belong to the same fund and have the same underlying portfolio to one observation. We use 
a matching algorithm that combines information from the fund's name and the portfolio number 
variable given by CRSP.30 Fund characteristics, such as the investment objective or the first 
offer date, are taken from the oldest share class. Quantitative information is either summed up, 
such as total net assets, or the weighted average over all share classes are taken, such as returns 
and fees. If two share classes of the same funds have different manager change dates, we use the 
most recent date. We classify the funds in our sample into three groups: (1) large and mid-cap 
funds (LMC), (2) small-cap funds (SC), and (3) sector funds (SEC). Because ICDI classification 
codes are no longer available in the 2011 cut off of the CRSP mutual fund database, we modify 
the selection criteria of Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) as follows. For our classification, we use 
Lipper codes, Wiesenberger codes and Strategic Insight codes (priority is given in that order if 
different codes are not consistent). Details are given in Table XIV. A fund is assigned to one of 
                                                 
 
30 A matching solely based on the portfolio number variable is not possible, as this variable is available only from 
December 1998 onwards. 
45 
 
the three groups for the total sample period if it belonged to this group for at least 50 percent of 
the observations in our sample period. We also classified our sample of domestic equity funds 
into the following 13 style groups: cap-based funds large-cap; cap-based funds mid-cap; cap-
based funds small-cap; style funds growth; style funds growth and income; style funds income; 
sector funds financial; sector funds health; sector funds natural resources; sector funds 
technology; sector funds utilities; sector funds other; and other. 
[Please insert Table XIV about here] 
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Figure 2: This figure presents the average monthly raw returns in percent per month of the decile portfolios
relative to the evaluation year (t). Portfolios are formed based on previous-year Bayesian four-factor alphas.
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Figure 3: This figure presents monthly four-factor alphas in percent per month for winner funds and winner-
fund subgroups based on both a single sorting and a double sorting on absolute fund flows and / or manager
change. The top panel presents the level of performance (four-factor alpha) in the evaluation period and the
bottom panel presents the change in performance between the formation and evaluation periods (∆ alpha).
Funds are assigned to the high-net-inflow (high) or low-net-inflow (low) subgroup based on whether their net
inflows during the formation period are higher or lower than the median net inflows of all other funds in the same
decile. Funds are assigned to the manager-change (with) or no-manager-change (without) subgroup based on
whether their fund manager changed during the formation period. Portfolios are formed based on previous-year
Bayesian four-factor alphas. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used for the regression coefficients.
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Figure 4: This figure presents monthly four-factor alphas in percent per month for loser funds and loser-fund
subgroups based on both a single sorting and a double sorting on absolute fund flows and / or manager change.
See the note to Figure 3 for more explanation.
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Figure 5: This figure presents monthly four-factor alphas in percentage points per month in the evaluation
period for the winner-minus-loser spread portfolio based on both a single sorting and a double sorting on absolute
fund flows and / or manager change. See the note to Figure 3 for more explanation.
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Table I: Characteristics of the funds in the sample
This table presents the characteristics of the sample of funds for subperiods and for the whole period from 1992
to 2011. We restrict our sample to funds that have at least 12 months of available return data and information
on the variable “mgr date” in the CRSP database (see Appendix). Row (1) reports the number of months
in the relevant period; row (2) reports monthly (arithmetic) average raw returns in excess of the rate on the
risk-free asset in percent; row (3) reports the average portfolio turnover in percent; row (4) reports average fees
in percent; row (5) reports the average age of the funds in years; row (6) reports the average fund size in million
USD; row (7) reports monthly average absolute net inflows in million USD; row (8) reports the number of funds
in existence; and row (9) reports the number of manager changes that occurred.
Subperiods Whole period
1992–2000 2001–2003 2004–2007 2008–2011
(1) # Months 108 36 48 48 240
(2) Raw returns (%) 0.82 -0.29 0.52 0.12 0.36
(3) Turnover (%) 105.17 136.15 95.64 92.42 104.42
(4) Annual fees (%) 1.45 1.51 1.39 1.36 1.42
(5) Fund age (years) 9.74 9.39 11.03 11.97 10.65
(6) Fund size (mill. USD) 753.68 754.38 1095.53 899.34 875.48
(7) Net inflows (mill. USD) 5.13 1.35 0.88 1.94 2.57
(8) # Funds 3,194 3,374 3,870 4,850 6,207
(9) # Man. ch. 3,173 1,517 1,799 1,430 7,919
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Table II: Characteristics of winner funds and winner-fund subgroups
This table presents the characteristics of winner funds, winner-fund subgroups and the resulting spread portfolios
based on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and manager change. See the note to Figure 1 for more
explanation on the portfolio formation. Panel (a) reports average absolute net inflows in the formation period
in million USD; panel (b) reports the fraction of funds experiencing a manager change during the formation
period; panel (c) reports the average fund size in the evaluation period in million USD; and panel (d) reports
the average fund size in the formation period in million USD. Within each panel, the first two rows and columns
report values conditional on net inflows and manager change, respectively. The third row and column report
spreads between the subgroups conditional on net inflows and manager changes, respectively. The fourth row
and column report unconditional values, i. e., not conditioned on net inflows or manager changes, respectively.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Net inflows Manager change
Without With Without All
− With
(a) Net inflows in formation period (flowst−1, in million USD)
Low −5.0 −8.4 3.4∗∗∗ −5.6
High 23.4 18.6 4.9∗∗∗ 22.6
Low − High −28.4∗∗∗ −27.0∗∗∗ −23.6∗∗∗ −28.2∗∗∗
All 9.5 5.4 3.6∗∗∗ 8.5
(b) Manager changes in formation period (mgr cht−1, in percentage points)
Low 0 100 − 17
High 0 100 − 17
Low − High − − − −
All 0 100 − 17
(c) Fund size in evaluation period (TNAt, in million USD)
Low 657.6 1, 016.1 −358.5∗∗∗ 715.8
High 1, 542.1 936.2 605.9∗∗∗ 1, 438.6
Low − High −884.6∗∗∗ 79.9 −278.7∗∗∗ −722.9
All 1, 050.2 966.8 83.3∗ 1, 037.0
(d) Fund size in formation period (TNAt−1, in million USD)
Low 622.7 947.0 −324.3∗∗∗ 675.0
High 1, 055.8 590.0 465.9∗∗∗ 976.4
Low − High −433.1∗∗∗ 357.1∗∗∗ 32.6 −301.4∗∗∗
All 801.0 756.9 44.2 794.0
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Table III: Alphas of winner funds and winner-fund subgroups
This table presents monthly four-factor alphas in percent of winner funds, winner-fund subgroups and the
resulting spread portfolios (in percentage points) based on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and manager
change. See the note to Figure 1 for more explanation on the portfolio formation and the note to Table II for
more explanation on row and column definitions. Panel (a) reports average four-factor alphas in the evaluation
period; panel (b) reports average four-factor alphas in the formation period; and panel (c) reports the change
in four-factor alphas between the formation and evaluation periods. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used for the
regression coefficients.
Net inflows Manager change
Without With Without All
− With
(a) Four-factor alphas in evaluation period (αt)
Low 0.08 0.11 −0.03 0.09
High −0.05 −0.11 0.06 −0.06
Low − High 0.13∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
All 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
(b) Four-factor alphas in formation period (αt−1)
Low 0.77∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.00 0.77∗∗∗
High 0.86∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.00 0.86∗∗∗
Low − High −0.09 −0.09 −0.08 −0.09
All 0.82∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.00 0.82∗∗∗
(c) Change in four-factor alphas (∆αt = αt − αt−1)
Low −0.69∗∗∗ −0.66∗∗∗ − −0.69∗∗∗
High −0.91∗∗∗ −0.96∗∗∗ − −0.92∗∗∗
Low − High − − − −
All −0.79∗∗∗ −0.80∗∗∗ − −0.81∗∗∗
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Table IV: Raw returns of winner funds and winner-fund subgroups
This table presents monthly raw returns in percent of winner funds, winner-fund subgroups and the resulting
spread portfolios (in percentage points) based on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and manager change.
See the note to Figure 1 for more explanation on the portfolio formation and the note to Table II for more
explanation on row and column definitions. Panel (a) reports average raw returns in the evaluation period;
panel (b) reports average raw returns in the formation period; and panel (c) reports the change in raw returns
between the formation and evaluation periods. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Net inflows Manager change
Without With Without All
− With
(a) Raw returns in evaluation period (rt)
Low 0.65 0.72 −0.07 0.66
High 0.54 0.50 0.03 0.53
Low − High 0.11∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.15 0.13∗∗
All 0.60 0.62 −0.01 0.59
(b) Raw returns in formation period (rt−1)
Low 1.27 1.23 0.04 1.26
High 1.63 1.66 −0.03 1.63
Low − High −0.35 −0.43 −0.39 −0.37
All 1.46 1.43 0.03 1.45
(c) Change in raw returns (∆rt = rt − rt−1)
Low −0.62 −0.51 − −0.60
High −1.09∗∗ −1.16∗∗ − −1.10∗∗
Low − High − − − −
All −0.86∗ −0.81 − −0.85∗
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Table V: Characteristics of loser funds and loser-fund subgroups
This table presents the characteristics of loser funds, loser-fund subgroups and the resulting spread portfolios
based on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and manager change. See the note to Table II for more
explanation.
Net inflows Manager change
With Without With All
− Without
(a) Net inflows in formation period (flowst−1, in million USD)
Low −13.2 −12.2 −1.0 −12.4
High 6.9 7.9 −1.0 7.8
Low − High −20.1∗∗∗ −20.1∗∗∗ −21.1∗∗∗ −20.2∗∗∗
All −4.5 −1.8 −2.7∗∗∗ −2.3
(b) Manager changes in formation period (mgr cht−1, in percentage points)
Low 100 0 − 22
High 100 0 − 16
Low − High − − − −
All 100 0 − 19
(c) Fund size in evaluation period (TNAt, in million USD)
Low 554.3 724.1 −169.8∗∗∗ 689.3
High 430.9 717.7 −286.8∗∗∗ 672.9
Low − High 123.4∗∗∗ 6.4 −163.4∗∗∗ 16.4
All 493.6 696.2 −202.7∗∗∗ 681.0
(d) Fund size in formation period (TNAt−1, in million USD)
Low 688.6 861.3 −172.8∗∗∗ 826.1
High 374.1 612.0 −238.0∗∗∗ 575.4
Low − High 314.5∗∗∗ 249.3∗∗∗ 76.5∗∗ 250.7∗∗∗
All 547.2 712.1 −164.9∗∗∗ 700.4
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Table VI: Alphas of loser funds and loser-fund subgroups
This table presents monthly four-factor alphas in percent of loser funds, loser-fund subgroups and the resulting
spread portfolios (in percentage points) based on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and manager change.
See the note to Table III for more explanation.
Net inflows Manager change
With Without With All
− Without
(a) Four-factor alphas in evaluation period (αt)
Low −0.09 −0.18∗∗ 0.08 −0.15∗
High −0.28∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.26∗∗∗
Low − High 0.19∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.10∗∗
All −0.19∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.21∗∗
(b) Four-factor alphas in formation period (αt−1)
Low −0.90∗∗∗ −0.91∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.91∗∗∗
High −0.88∗∗∗ −0.88∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.88∗∗∗
Low − High −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.03
All −0.89∗∗∗ −0.90∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.89
(c) Change in four-factor alphas (∆αt = αt − αt−1)
Low 0.81∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ − 0.75∗∗∗
High 0.60∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ − 0.62∗∗∗
Low − High − − − −
All 0.71∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ − 0.68∗∗∗
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Table VII: Raw returns of loser funds and loser-fund subgroups
This table presents monthly raw returns in percent of loser funds, loser-fund subgroups and the resulting spread
portfolios (in percentage points) based on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and manager change. See
the note to Table IV for more explanation.
Net inflows Manager change
With Without With All
− Without
(a) Raw returns in evaluation period (rt)
Low 0.49 0.37 0.12∗∗ 0.40
High 0.28 0.29 −0.01 0.29
Low − High 0.21∗∗∗ 0.08 0.20∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗
All 0.39 0.32 0.07∗ 0.34
(b) Raw returns in formation period (rt−1)
Low −0.35 −0.46 0.11 −0.44
High −0.28 −0.27 −0.01 −0.27
Low − High −0.07 −0.19 −0.08 −0.18
All −0.33 −0.38 0.05 −0.36
(c) Change in raw returns (∆rt = rt − rt−1)
Low 0.84∗ 0.83∗ − 0.84∗
High 0.56 0.56 − 0.56
Low − High − − − −
All 0.71 0.69 − 0.70
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Table VIII: Alphas of winner-minus-loser spread portfolios
This table presents monthly four-factor alphas in percent of the winner- and loser-fund subgroups and the
resulting spread portfolios (in percentage points) based on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and manager
change. Panel (a) reports details on the portfolio formation and panel (b) reports four-factor alphas. See the
note to Figure 1 for more explanation on the portfolio formation. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used for the
regression coefficients.
Without equilibrium mech. Uncond. With equilibrium mech.
Neither No flows No manager − Manager ch. Flows only Both
change only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) Portfolio formation
Winner funds
Inflows Low Low − − − High High
Manager ch. Without − Without − With − With
Loser funds
Inflows High High − − − Low Low
Manager ch. Without − Without − With − With
(b) Four-factor alphas in evaluation period (αt)
Winner 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.02 −0.06 −0.11
Loser −0.25∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.19∗∗ −0.15∗ −0.09
Winner − loser 0.34∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.09 −0.02
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Table IX: Peer-group-adjusted returns of winner- and loser-fund subgroups
This table presents peer-group-adjusted returns in percent per month of winner and loser funds and the winner-
and loser-fund subgroups as well as the resulting spread portfolios (in percentage points) based on independent
sorts on absolute fund flows and manager change. Peer-group-adjusted returns are defined as the difference
between fund i’s returns and the average returns of all peer-group funds P with the same fund style. The
following style groups exist in our data set (all U. S. domestic equities): cap-based funds large-cap; cap-based
funds mid-cap; cap-based funds small-cap; style funds growth; style funds growth and income; style funds
income; sector funds financial; sector funds health; sector funds natural resources; sector funds technology;
sector funds utilities; sector funds other; and other. See the note to Figure 1 for more explanation on the
portfolio formation and the note to Table II for more explanation on row and column definitions. Panel (a)
reports the results for winner funds and panel (b) reports results for loser funds. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(a) Winner funds: Peer-group adjusted returns (ri,t − rP,t)
Net inflows Manager change
Without With Without All
− With
Low 0.16 0.09 0.06 0.14
High 0.06 0.06 −0.01 0.06
Low − High 0.10∗ 0.03 0.10∗ 0.09∗∗
All 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.10
(b) Loser funds: Peer-group adjusted returns (ri,t − rP,t)
Net inflows Manager change
With Without With All
− Without
Low 0.04 −0.11 0.15∗∗∗ −0.07
High −0.15 −0.14 −0.01 −0.15
Low − High 0.19∗∗∗ 0.03 0.18∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗
All −0.00 −0.13 0.08∗∗ −0.11
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Table X: Alphas of winner- and loser-fund subgroups based on a ranking including the active peer benchmark
(APB) factor
This table presents monthly four-factor alphas in percent in the evaluation period of winner and loser funds
and the winner- and loser-fund subgroups as well as the resulting spread portfolios (in percentage points) based
on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and manager change. For ranking funds into decile portfolios, the
four-factor model (Carhart, 1997) has been augmented by an active peer benchmark (APB) factor in order to
control for the fact that estimation errors are potentially not independently distributed in the cross section of
funds, as suggested by Hunter et al. (2014). See the note to Figure 1 for more explanation on the portfolio
formation and the note to Tables II and V for more explanation on row and column definitions. Panel (a) reports
the results for winner funds and winner-fund subgroups and panel (b) reports the results for loser funds and
loser-fund subgroups. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White’s
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used for the regression coefficients.
(a) Winner funds: Four-factor alphas in evaluation period (αt)
Net inflows Manager change
Without With Without All
− With
Low 0.13 0.23∗ −0.10 0.14
High −0.04 −0.06 0.01 −0.05
Low − High 0.17∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.18∗ 0.19∗∗
All 0.05 0.09 −0.04 0.05
(b) Loser funds: Four-factor alphas in evaluation period (αt)
Net inflows Manager change
With Without With All
− Without
Low −0.07 −0.16∗ 0.09 −0.14
High −0.29∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.25∗∗∗
Low − High 0.22∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
All −0.17∗∗ −0.21∗∗ 0.04 −0.20∗∗
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Table XI: Alphas of characteristics-matched sub-samples of winner-fund subgroups
This table presents monthly four-factor alphas of spread portfolios of the characteristics-matched sub-samples of
winner-fund subgroups (in percentage points) based on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and manager
change. See the note to Figure 1 for more explanation on the portfolio formation. The first column reports the
number of funds in the respective characteristics-matched sub-sample. Note that the number of observations
of the sub-samples adds up to more than the total number of funds in our sample (6,207) because some funds
appear in different sub-samples over their lifetime. The second column reports the change in four-factor alphas
between the formation and evaluation periods. The third and fourth columns report spreads between the
subgroups conditional on net inflows and manager changes, respectively. The fifth column reports spreads
between the subgroups conditional on net inflows and manager changes simultaneously. Panel (a) reports the
results for large (i. e., above median fund TNA) vs. small funds; panel (b) reports the results for old (i. e., fund
age above median) vs. young funds; panel (c) reports the results for funds with different investment styles; panel
(d) reports the results for funds with high (i. e., above median) vs. low distribution fees; panel (e) reports the
results for large (i. e., above median fund family TNA) vs. small fund families; panel (f) reports the results for
retail vs. institutional funds; and panel (g) reports the results for the full sample for comparison. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors are used for the regression coefficients.
Persistence Single sorting Double sort.
Number ∆αt Low Without Low w/o
of obs. − High − With − High with
(a) Fund size
Large funds 3,466 −0.75∗∗∗ 0.06 −0.02 0.02
Small funds 5,371 −0.72∗∗∗ 0.06 0.11 0.15
(b) Fund age
Old funds 3,858 −0.73∗∗∗ 0.10∗ −0.03 0.04
Young funds 5,221 −0.83∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.06 0.35∗∗∗
(c) Investment style
Large- and mid-cap 579 −0.93∗∗∗ 0.07 0.21 0.23
Small-cap 898 −0.86∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
Growth & Inc. and Inc. 1,357 −0.36∗∗∗ 0.06 0.01 0.08
Growth 2,384 −0.70∗∗∗ 0.02 0.04 0.10
All exc. sector and other 5,619 −0.76∗∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.09∗ 0.14∗
(d) Size of distribution fees
High distribution fee 3,853 −0.79∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ −0.06 0.20∗∗
Low distribution fee 2,994 −0.81∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.02 0.17
(e) Size of fund family
Large fund families 4,055 −0.86∗∗∗ 0.11∗ −0.04 0.04
Small fund families 3,337 −0.78∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.03 0.19∗∗
(f) Investor type
Retail 4,037 −0.81∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ −0.02 0.17∗
Institutional 2,771 −0.71∗∗∗ −0.02 0.11 0.19
(g) Full sample (for comparison)
All 6,207 −0.81∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.01 0.19∗∗
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Table XII: Alphas of characteristics-matched sub-samples of loser-fund subgroups
This table presents monthly four-factor alphas of spread portfolios of the characteristics-matched sub-samples
of loser-fund subgroups (in percentage points) based on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and manager
change. See the note to Figure 1 for more explanation on the portfolio formation and the note to Table XI for
more explanation on column and row definitions. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used for the regression coefficients.
Persistence Single sorting Double sort.
Number ∆αt Low Without Low w/o
of obs. − High − With − High with
(a) Fund size
Large funds 3,466 0.63∗∗∗ 0.09 0.04 0.13
Small funds 5,371 0.75∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.08 0.17∗
(b) Fund age
Old funds 3,858 0.68∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
Young funds 5,221 0.66∗∗∗ 0.08 −0.09 0.01
(c) Investment style
Large- and mid-cap 579 0.59∗∗∗ 0.01 0.15 0.26∗∗
Small-cap 898 0.70∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.01 0.19
Growth & Inc. and Inc. 1,357 0.44∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.00 0.01
Growth 2,384 0.62∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.06 0.17∗
All exc. sector and other 5,619 0.64∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.05 0.17∗∗∗
(d) Size of distribution fees
High distribution fee 3,853 0.68∗∗∗ 0.03 0.08 0.12
Low distribution fee 2,994 0.69∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.04 0.21∗∗
(e) Size of fund family
Large fund families 4,055 0.70∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.07 0.19∗
Small fund families 3,337 0.66∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ −0.02 0.11
(f) Investor type
Retail 4,037 0.70∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.04 0.13∗∗
Institutional 2,771 0.59∗∗∗ 0.08 0.04 0.11
(g) Full sample (for comparison)
All 6,207 0.68∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.03 0.16∗∗
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Table XIII: Alphas of winner- and loser-fund subgroups across different market cycles
This table presents monthly four-factor alphas of spread portfolios of winner- and loser-fund subgroups (in
percentage points) based on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and manager change across different
market cycles. See the note to Figure 1 for more explanation on the portfolio formation. The first column reports
the unconditional four-factor alpha of the winner and loser funds, respectively. The second column reports the
change in four-factor alphas between the formation and evaluation periods. The third and fourth columns
report spreads between the subgroups conditional on net inflows and manager changes, respectively. The fifth
column reports spreads between the subgroups conditional on net inflows and manager changes simultaneously.
Panel (a) reports the results for winner funds and panel (b) for loser funds. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used for
the regression coefficients.
(a) Winner funds
Uncond. Persistence Single sorting Double sort.
Dec. 10 ∆αt Low Without Low w/o
− High − With − High with
1992−2000 (Bull market) 0.13 −0.73∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.10 0.45∗∗∗
2001−2003 (Bear market) −0.26 −1.46∗∗∗ 0.15 −0.03 0.12
2004−2007 (Bull market) −0.08 −0.65∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.02 −0.04
2008−2011 (Bear market) −0.13 −0.81∗∗∗ 0.09∗ −0.12 −0.03
Whole period 0.01 −0.81∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.01 0.19∗∗
(b) Loser funds
Uncond. Persistence Single sorting Double sort.
Dec. 1 ∆αt Low With Low with
− High − Without − High w/o
1992−2000 (Bull market) −0.20 0.79∗∗∗ 0.02 0.13∗ 0.23∗
2001−2003 (Bear market) −0.52∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.08 −0.08 0.04
2004−2007 (Bull market) −0.09 0.80∗∗∗ 0.08 0.02 0.10
2008−2011 (Bear market) −0.19∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ −0.03 0.03
Whole period −0.21∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.03 0.16∗∗
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